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As we celebrate 200 years of history under our Constitution, some
of the most controversial issues arising under that grand document
involve conflicting visions of the family. Can the government induce
men to support their children by barring those who fail to do so from
marrying?, May the state prohibit interracial marriage, 2 or marriage

*Professor of LaW-, New York University Law School. This article was delivered as the
Dunwody Lecture at the University of Florida School of Law, on March 20, 1987. The author
gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Dunwody Lecture program and the NYU
Law School Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund. Two New
York University Law School students, Mary Faith Herndon and Susan Hart, provided creative
and energetic assistance. Many people provided helpful comments on an earlier draft, including:
Ellen Chesler, Norman Dorsen, William Nelson, Linda Kerber, Sybil Lipschutz, Martha Minow,
and David Richards.
1. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375-77 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the
state may not thus limit access to marriage.
2. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967), the Court answered no.
583
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between two people of the same sex?- Can the state affirm the historic
and contemporary reality that women care for children and home, by
defining the alimony obligation as one that men owe to women? 4 Can
the state encourage marriage by restricting benefits to children whose

parents do not marry, or by limiting fathers' rights to establish relationships with children borne by women to whom they are not married?5 Does the Constitution protect peoples' right to use contraceptives?6 Does it matter whether the people are married?7 And does it
make a difference if they are old enough to vote?8 Does the Constitution
protect women's liberty to decide whether to have an abortion?9
Today some influential lawyers, scholars, judges, and public officials urge us to look to the original intent of the men who drafted
and ratified the Constitution to determine its contemporary meaning.10

3. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2842-43 (1986), the Court upheld a Georgia
law prohibiting sexual relations between people of the same sex.
4. The Supreme Court has held that alimony obligations must be cast in sex-neutral terms.
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1979).
5. The Supreme Court's answer to these questions is complex. See generally Law, Rethinking Sex and the Contitation, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 988-98 (1984) (Supreme Court has on
two occasions upheld state policies that differentiated between unmarried women and unmarried
men).
6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-86 (1965), held that the state may not prohibit
married people from using contraceptives.
7. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972), the Supreme Court held that states
may not prohibit unmarried persons from purchasing and/or using contraceptives.
8. In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1977), the Supreme Court
held that the blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is unconstitutional.
In that opinion, the Court relied on its previous decision in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), that a state may not enact "blanket provisions" requiring parental consent
whenever an unmarried minor sought an abortion (luring the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.
Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
Yet, in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979), the Court established an exceedingly
complex, cumbersome process under which the state may require parental consent for, or state
judicial review of, a minor's decision to have an abortion.
9. The Court has held that the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of liberty encompasses
a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 41) U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973); that
a state may not create barriers that restrict women's access to abortion, absent a compelling
state purpose, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
427-30 (1983); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 U.S. 2169,
2178 (1986).
10. See, e.g., "IClonstitutional law should be rooted in principles that are derived from the
text and original intention of the Constitution." United States Att'y Gen. Edwin Meese, Speech
Before the American Enterprise Institute 8 (Sept. 6, 1986) (arguing that Roe v. Wade should
be overruled). Courts should "return to a jurisprudence of original intention - i.e., a way of
constitutional thinking and litigating that begins with the text of the Constitution, as informed
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This article examines our constitutional founders' ideas about families
and women. It argues that judges today cannot look directly at the
intent of the constitutional framers to resolve constitutional claims
premised on conflicting visions of the family. Original intent does not
provide answers for today's problems for two reasons. First, the people
who crafted our Constitution held conflicting ideas and values about
families and the role of women in society. Second, and perhaps more
important, the founders' dominant conceptions of families denied the
liberty, equality, and even personhood of women. Today, there is
broad consensus across a moral and political spectrum, that women
are full human beings, entitled to the panoply of classic liberal rights
that our revolution and Constitution sought to secure to white men.
The challenge today is to envision constitutional and cultural arrangements that read the words "We the People" quite literally, even though
that was not originally intended.
The following discussion is divided into three sections. The first
recounts the dominant story about women and families told by our
original constitutional drafters. The second tells of the burst of increased liberty and equality of the Revolutionary period. The third
briefly presents conflicting stories about women and families told by
those who crafted the Civil War Amendments. The final section comments on the meaning of this history for contemporary constitutional
debate.
Each of these stories considers information from constitutional debates; the intellectual, moral, and philosophical concepts that influenced those debates; the ordinary legal context that defined formal
rights and relationships; and the living context in which these political
and intellectual debates were rooted. Our Constitution is, after all, a
popular document reflecting the aspirations and prejudices of ordinary
people, as well as the ideas of those elite white men who are conventionally credited with its parentage.

by the intentions of those who wrote, proposed, and ratified that text." Assistant Att'y Gen.
Bradford Reynolds, Remarks at the Federal Society Symposium in Chicago 2 (Nov. 15, 1982).

See generally, R.

BERm(.E,

GOVERNMNINT BY JUI)ICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION or THE

FouIFrEN'ITH AiENDMIENT 300-11, 363-72, 407-18 (1977); J. CHOPIER. JuDICIA. R'IEW AN)
THE NATIONAL. POLITICAL PiRoCEss 24143 (1980); Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First

Amendment Problems, 47 IN. L.J. 1 (1971); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 698-99 (1976).
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THE FIRST STORY: THE DOMINANT VISION OF FAMILIES
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Silence, absolute and deafening, is the central theme of the original
founders' discussions of women and families.", In search of their wisdom on these issues, I have scrutinized the constitutional text, the
Federalist Papers, the historic national debates that produced the
Constitution, and the discussions throughout the land in which individual colonies decided to ratify the proposed Constitution of the
United States. Virtually nothing in the original constitutional debates
directly addresses the situation of women and families, or illuminates
the difficult issues we confront today. 12 In the FederalistPapers, for
example, the only reference to women or families is a brief allegorical
discussion of the dangers that the private intrigues of courtesans and
3
mistresses pose to the safety of the state.'
One often cited discussion of these issues is the private dialogue
contained in the letters between John and Abigail Adams.' 4 On March

11.

It is singularly appropriate that Virginia Dare, the earliest American woman
whose name is familiar to the general public, vanished without a trace shortly after
her birth, along with all the other members of the Roanoke colony. Like her,
successive generations of American women have vanished from the historical record,
leaving not even their names for their descendents to recognize and revere. The
United States has founding mothers of various races and ethnic backgrounds, but
on the whole our history celebrates only the white founding fathers whose names
appear again and again in standard textbooks.
M. NORTON & C. BERKIN, Women and American History, in WOMEN OF AIERICA 3(1979).
12. References to family appear in the ratification debates about whether a bill of rights
was necessary or whether the structure of the Constitution preserves to the people those rights
not explicitly granted to the government. For example, Hamilton supported the Constitution
and believed that its structure, without an explicit bill of rights, reserved rights to the people.
He denied, moreover, that federal constitutional power could "penetrate the recesses of domestic
life, and control, in all respects, the private conduct of individuals." 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

268 (1941). Others, such as Patrick Henry of Virginia, opposed the Constitution as fatally
defective without a bill of rights. Henry also speaks of the core of liberty as the sphere in which
a man "enjoys the fruits of his labor, under his own fig-tree, with his wife and children around
him, in peace and security." 3 J. ELLIOT, .upra, at 54.
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (A. Hamilton).
14. Adams' role in crafting our Constitution is controversial. From 1774 when he left his
family to serve in the Continential Congress, John Adams was a staunch supporter of the
Revolution. Beginning in 1777, he represented the Revolutionary American government for a
decade in a variety of European diplomatic missions. Both his long absence in Europe, and the
substance of his views on the Constitution, placed him outside the mainstream of debate on the
original Constitution. Nonetheless, both his ideas and services to country earned John Adams
a place in the galaxy of constitutional founders. See G. WOOD, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL,
1776-1787, at 567-92 (1969).
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31, 1776, on the eve of the Declaration of Independence, John Adams
was serving in the Continental Congress in New York, while Abigail
Adams, in the midst of insecurity, war, and epidemic, managed their
farm, family, and household in Braintree, Massachusetts. She wrote:
I long to hear that you have declared an independency
and by the way in the new Code of Laws which I suppose
it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would
Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favourable
to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited
powers into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men
would be tyrants if they could. If perticular [sic] care and
attention is not paid to the Ladies we are determined to
foment a Rebelion [sic], and will not hold ourselves bound
by any Laws in which we have no voice, or Representation.
That your Sex are Naturally Tyrannical is a Truth so
thoroughly established as to admit of no dispute, but such
of you as wish to be happy willingly give up the harsh title
of Master for the more tender and endearing one of Friend.
Why then, not put it out of the power of the vicious and
the Lawless to use us with cruelty and indignity with impunity. Men of Sense in all Ages abhor those customs which
treat us only as the vassals of your Sex. Regard us then as
Beings placed by providence under your protection and in
immitation [sic] of the Supreem [sic] Being make use of that
power only for our happiness. 15
-

John Adams' response made plain both that he did not take her modest
request seriously and that he saw alteration of the traditional relations
between men and women as a threat to the social order he knew. He
replied:
As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but
laugh. We have been told that our Struggle has loosened
the bands of Government every where. That Children and
Apprentices were disobedient - that schools and Colleges
were grown turbulent - that Indians slighted their Guardians and Negroes grew insolent to the Masters. But your
Letter was the first Intimation that another Tribe more
numerous and powerful than all the rest were grown discon-

15. M. FIEIL)IEANDER & Al. KLINE, THE BOOK OF ABIGAIL
IA.'rERS OF THE AI)Atis FAMILY, 1762-1784, at 121 (1975).
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tented. - This is rather too coarse a Compliment but you
are so saucy, I wont blot it out.
Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our Masculine system. Although they are in full Force, you know
they are little more than Theory. We dare not exert our
Power in its full Latitude. We are obliged to go fair, and
softly, and in Practice you know We are the subjects. We
have only the Name of Masters, and rather than give up
this, which would completely subject Us to the Despotism
of the Petticoat, I hope General Washington, and all our
brave Heroes would fight. I am sure every good Politician
would plot, as long as he would against Despotism, Empire,
Monarchy, Aristocracy, Oligarchy or Ochlocracy.16
John Adams' confident belief that "our Masculine system" would long
endure reflected the intellectual tradition of his time. Many of the
men who crafted the fundamental structures of our democracy drew
on the work of the classic and more contemporary philosophers, as
well as their own experience, in creating the new American republic. '
For political philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle, to Rousseau and
Locke, the function of the family and the nature of women were
matters of importance. With the exception of the vision Plato offered
in the Republic, all of these philosophers assumed the necessity of
the male-headed nuclear family, and women's subservient role in that
family.' 8

16.
17.

Id. at 123.
[T]he Americans were seeking to determine the scientific principles that would
explain man's political and social actions, "the principles of Aristole and Plato, of
Livy and Cicero, and Sidney, Harrington and Locke; the principles of nature and
eternal reason; the principles on which the whole government over us now stands."
G. WOOD, supra note 14, at 8; see generally id. at 14, 29, 48, 290, 371, 282-91.
18. For an excellent discussion, see S. OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1979). "Plato's treatment of women in the Republic is clearly unparalleled in the history of
Western thought." Id. at 234. Plato argued that the innate qualities of women could not be
known, so long as the socialization and education of the sexes was so different. See PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC 209-10 (H.D. Lee trans. 1955). As a prescriptive matter, THE REPUBLIC would
include women in the guardian or governing class for both moral reasons and because confining
all women to domestic seclusion was extremely wasteful of human resources. But for Plato,
including women in the public sphere was made possible only by abolishing the family and
creating a highly hierarchal society in which essential work was done by slaves and others
excluded from the privileged class. Throughout our history Americans have rejected this notion
and affirmed the core social role of the family. See Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Indeed
even Plato, in later work, THE LAW, affirmed the value of the family and resurrected the
notion of women's natural domesticity to preserve it. See PLATO, THE LAW 805a-d (1934).
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In Enlightenment political theory, the male headed family, not the
individual, was the basic unit of political interaction. For example, in
the political sphere, John Locke challenged absolute patriarchal rule
and virtual representation of ordinary people by the elite.19 Yet, at
the same time, he thought it natural and inevitable that men were
dominant in the home and represented the family in politics. Where
matters of common interest and property are concerned, Locke argued,
since the husband and wife may disagree, the husband should prevail
' 20
because he is "the abler and the stronger.
Our constitutional founders also relied more directly on the contemporary political writings of the English Commonwealth and Radical
Whig Opposition. Historian Linda Kerber observed that the American
political system emulates the historical English Whig notion of ignoring
basic values concerning women. American Whigs, like their British
ancestors, did not clutter their political theory with concepts concern21
ing the correct relationship between women and politics.
Historian Carl Degler summarized the ideology of our founders
concerning the role of women in society. The founders denied that
women were individuals with a separate identity. Rather, as the legal
and customary head of the family, the husband was the only family
member worthy of characterization as an individual.- This historical
denigration of women is no trivial matter. The consequence of the
founders' belief is not just that women were unfairly excluded from

19. Locke attacks Robert Filmer's effort to justify absolute monarchy by analogy to the
patriarchal family. Filmer relied on the biblical injunction to "honor thy father." Locke took
seriously the biblical commandment to "Honor thy father and thy mother" and argued that if
family power and responsibility is shared by men and women, governmental power too must
be shared and limited by mutual responsibility. 1 J. LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(T. Cook ed. 1947). For discussion, see L. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT
AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 16-19 (1981).
20. 1 J. LOCKE, supra note 19, at 210.
Thomas Hobbes, while generally recognizing that civilization is the product of convention
and not nature, defended patriarchy on the grounds that "men, are naturally fitter than women,
for actions of labour and danger" and "for the most part commonwealths have been erected by
the fathers, not by the mothers and families." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 128, 131 (M. Oakeshott
ed. 1946).
Rousseau had strong ideas about women's proper place. Women ought "[to oblige us, to do
us service, to gain our love and esteem ...
these are the duties of the sex at all times, and
what they ought to learn from their infancy." 3 ROSSEAU, EMILIUS, OR A TREATISE OF
EDUCATION 74-75 (1763).
21. L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 28, 30.
22. C. DEGLER, AT ODDS 189 (1980).
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public life. Women were assigned, on the basis of status, to perform
the essential work of production, reproduction, maintenance, consumption, and acculturation in the home. Home and family, the core social
unit upon which our constitutional, political, and economic arrangements are built, were constructed on the premise that women are not
active citizens or people free to pursue the full range of common
occupations and callings.
The ordinary law that governed the lives of our constitutional framers and their contemporaries also assumed, along with the philosophers
and political theorists, that the patriarchal family was natural and
socially vital. Blackstone's Commentaries, published in England between 1765 and 1769, was quickly reprinted in America.2 For colonists,
without law books, the Commentaries was a convenient codification
of the British common law and was widely accepted and used. Even
after independence, it served as a guide to those portions of the common law that American statutes had not revised.24 The Commentaries
had great appeal to American constitutional drafters, not simply as a
statement of common law, but also as an effort to glean basic tenets
from English common law and make them a science.2
As Blackstone explained, when a woman married, her legal identity
merged into that of her husband. She was civilly dead. She could not
sue, be sued, enter into contracts, make wills, keep her own earnings,
or control her own property. Her husband had the right to chastise
her, restrain her freedom, and force her to engage in sexual intercourse
against her will.26 Close examination of the property rights of American
women, both before and after the Revolution, reveals "above all else
a picture of their enforced dependence . . . ."
Because in American political theory, claims to political rights were
premised on Locke's notion that only those who owned a stake in the
community property had a voice in its affairs, the married woman
whose control over her property had passed to her husband by mar-

23. The first American edition of Blackstone was published in Philadelphia in 1771. See
Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic:A Study of Intellectual Impact,
51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 737 n.36 (1976).
24. Kerber, From the Declarationof Independence to the Declarationof Sentiments: The
Legal Status of Women in the EarlyRepublic 1776-1848, in 6 HUMAN RIGHTS 115, 119 (1977).
25.

G.

MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 91 (1857), quoted in

G. WOOD, supra note 14, at 10.
26. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442-44 (Tucker ed. 1803); Williams, Reflections
on Culture, Courts and Feminism, in 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175, 176-77 (1982).
27.
M. SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA, at xv (1986).
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riage had also conceded her political voice.2 By this logic, unmarried
adult women property owners should have been allowed to vote. But,
while unmarried women could protect their property, they were not
permitted to exercise the political rights that theoretically accompanied
those economic interests.
Formal legal rules do not necessarily describe ordinary daily life.
While there are serious limits on our ability to understand the texture
of ordinary life in the eighteenth century, we do know that the families
our founders knew were profoundly different from the families of
today. Economic, personal, and sexual relations among family members would seem foreign to us. Families stood in different relation to
the community, church, state, and economy. When our Constitution
was adopted, "over ninety per cent of the population lived outside the
few cities, and the number of large-scale enterprises within the cities
and towns could be counted on the fingers of two hands." The family
was the central economic unit of society, both producing and consuming
almost all goods and services. Often family members worked together,
whether production was for consumption or for sale, and whether the
family lived in rural areas or ran cooperative enterprises such as
shops, inns, and other businesses in towns and villages.
Legal, religious, and social ideology condemned any sexual relationship except procreative sex within marriage. The strictures on sexual
behavior and the expectations of patriarchal family life were enforced
by the formal legal rules, the family, the churches, and neighbors of
the communities in which people lived. Privacy was rare in the founders' America. Most people lived in small houses in which all family
members slept in the same room, especially during winter, when a
single fireplace provided heat for the entire home. Loosely constructed
houses allowed neighbors and kin to observe what happened behind
closed doors.3° Churches fined or excommunicated sexual transgressors, and public opinion reinforced community values by condemning
extramarital sexuality. 31 A homogeneous population, common religious
values, and geographical proximity facilitated community responsibility for upholding conventional moral standards.3

28. See Kerber, supra note 24, at 118.
29. C. DEGLER, supra note 22, at 5.
30. D. FLARHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 42-43, 76 (1972).
31. P. LASLETT, THE WORLD WE HAVE LOST 155, 158 (1984).
32. The boundary between family and community was much more permeable than it is
today. P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 405-07
(R. Baldick trans. 1962).
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Custom and law strongly encouraged family formation and virtually
everyone lived in a family. New England colonies forbade solitary
living, to insure that everyone would be subject to the discipline of
living in a family unit.3 Fathers controlled their children's choices of

marital partners, basing those choices on economic factors rather than
attraction or affection.- Connecticut even made it a crime for a man
to court a woman without her father's permission.s But even without
the legal rules, economic survival necessitated family living for all but
a few affluent men.
The central fact of family life of the late eighteenth century was
that once married, women of all classes could expect to bear children
from the time of marriage until menopause. The average white woman
of the Revolutionary era bore more than seven children. 36 Black
women, whose masters could increase their human property simply
by encouraging their female slaves' fertility, experienced ten or eleven
37
pregnancies during their fertile years.
This pattern of constant childbearing was both debilitating to
women and sometimes fatal. Pregnancy, and caring for newborns and
children who survived past infancy must have been exhausting, espe-

33. The Massachusetts Bay Colony prohibited solitary living from early in its history. In
1669 the Plymouth Colony first compelled unmarried persons to live under regular "family
government." Even when Plymouth allowed unmarried men to live alone, they were required
to seek permission of local authorities to do so and permission could be withdrawn if they
deviated from accepted standards of decent behavior. Spinsters invariably lived with a relative,
either a parent or sibling. J. DEMOS, A LITrLE COMMONWEALTH, FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH
COLONY 77-78 (1970).
34. J. FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST
PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY 1750-1800, at 136 (1982). The legal norms were not always followed.
Indeed, Fleigelman's central thesis is that "[tihe struggle for American independence and for
subsequent federal union was intimately related to, and ideologically reflected in, a national
affirmation of the sacred character of affectional and voluntaristic marriage." Id. at 129.
35. See C. DEGLER, supra note 22, at 9. Paternal influence over choice of marriage partner
was less pronounced in the Southern colonies, id. at 11, perhaps because there were so many
more men than women during the early history of these colonies.
36. In 1800, the average woman bore 7.04 children. The birth rate had fallen steadily since
1750. Id. at 181. Average birth rates in Plymouth Colony were 7.8 for first generation families,
8.6 for second generation families, and 9.3 for third generation families. J. DEMOS, supra note
33, at 192.
37. M. NORTON, The Myth of the Golden Age, in WOMEN OF AMERICA, A HISTORY,
supra note 11, at 37 [hereinafter The Myth]. "Even though at the time of the Revolution blacks
constituted amongst 20 percent of the American population, a higher percentage than at any
time thereafter, historians have completely neglected the study of female slaves in the colonial
era." Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss3/1
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cially when combined with the work of running a household. Women
engaged in production of clothing and food, time-consuming food preparation and preservation, candle and soap making and doing laundry
in iron pots over open fires, with water carried by hand from the
nearest well or stream.
Understandably, many women experienced dissatisfaction with
domestic life. Discontent might have been rooted not simply in the
necessity of hard work, but also in the invariable routine of domestic
labor. Even the poorest male farmer had greater opportunities to
participate in more diverse activities than his wife had. A farmer's
basic cycle was yearly, while his wife's was daily and weekly. The
wife also had additional obligations each season 9 The all-encompassing
domestic role left women little or no private time. While most women
did not question their lot, they often belittled their work and under40
stood that it had very low status in the eyes of society.
Thus, the conventional story of women and families in the time of
the founders assumed that women were assigned by birth to a life
of relentless procreation and work. Privacy and individuality did not
exist and were regarded as suspect. The family, the central political,
economic, and social unit of the society, was tightly integrated with
and controlled by community and church.
This story is not intended to bemoan that life was difficult in the
colonial era. 41 Nor is this story presented to suggest a view of history
as ineluctable progress. Observe how far we have come. Rather, this
story is intended to convey a totality of social assumptions about family
and women that are both so profoundly sexist, and so foreign to late
twentieth century America, as to preclude any assumption that the
founders' particular views on a discrete issue can be assimilated as
guidance for contemporary society.

38.

Id. at 44.
M. NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF
AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800, at 12 (1980) [hereinafter LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS].
40. Id. at 34-39.
41. Although "historians of American women have traditionally regarded the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries as a 'golden age,' in which women were better off than either their
English female contemporaries or their descendants of the succeeding Victorian era," today
serious historians regard the issue of progress for women as far more complex. See, e.g., The
Myth, supra note 37, at 37.
39.
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II.

THE SECOND STORY: STIRRINGS OF LIBERTY AND
EQUALITY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FAMILY LIFE

It is possible to tell another, very different story about the founding
fathers, families, and women. This is a story of increasing gender
equality and sexual liberty. This story too is a part of our constitutional
legacy.
In principle, the central tenet of our Constitution is that all lawful
power derives from the people. The state is nothing more than the
sum of its citizens. The people themselves are sovereign. Against a
long religious and secular tradition in which the populace conceived
of legitimacy and power as flowing from God and the monarch, our
constitutional founders were truly revolutionary in asserting that the
people are sovereign and the State is merely an artifact that serves
to effectuate those purposes specifically assigned to it by the people.
Our founders' revolutionary new concept of political theory embodies
two conflicting elements. On the one hand, the state is ultimately
responsible to the will of the majority. On the other hand, the power
of the state is strictly limited, no matter what the will of the majority,
according to the non-majoritarian precepts of a constitutional structure.
Enlightenment thought has accurately been described as reflecting
a hope to eliminate political passivity and dependence.42 The champions
of our Revolution and Constitution rebelled against the patriarchal
power of kings and the notion that political authority may legitimately
rest on birth status. 43 That their culture prevented them from perceiving clearly that these anti-patriarchal principles also have a direct
application to women and families does not eradicate the centrality of
the founders' commitment to equality and individual liberty.
Abigail Adams was not alone in questioning the political theory by
which women had "no voice, or Representation." In an early Revolutionary paper, James Otis" asked, "Are not women born as free as men?
Would it not be infamous to assert that the ladies are all slaves by
nature?"'4. In 1781, Mary Willing Byrd contested a Virginia decision

42.

F.

WEINSTEIN

& G.

PLATT, THE WISH TO BE FREE: SOCIETY, PSYCHE AND VALUE

CHANGE 49 (1969).

43. "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States." U.S. CONST art. I, § 9.
44. Otis, of Massachusetts, an early supporter of the Revolution, argued more generally
that the Constitution codified preexisting human rights. See G. WOOD, supra note 14, at 292-94.
45. L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 30-31. Kerber observes, "Although Otis could ask embarrassing questions and imply their answers, on this as on so many points of theory, his developing
mental illness prevented him from suggesting constitutional devices for implementing them."
Id. at 31.
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depriving her of property and claimed redress as a woman, mother
of eight children, a virtuous person, and a friend to the United States
who always abided by the laws. 46 In explaining the implications of
being virtuous she adopted the Revolutionaries' own rhetoric, saying
she had paid her taxes even though she had never been personally or
7
virtually represented.4
In daily life, many women and families of the Revolutionary era
did not fit the ideological mold ascribed to them.4 8 The traditional
school book narrative of the American Revolution depicts a series of
pitched battles between uniformed armies. But in fact, the Revolution
was a civil war involving the entire population. With men away in
the Army, white American women confronted critical choices and assumed responsibility for maintenance of family and property. 9 As
active fighting drew near, women had to decide whether to attempt
to flee to safety or to stay and protect their homes. Flight, with
children and such provisions as they could carry, was harrowing. The
Army often required those who stood firm to quarter and maintain
soldiers, and displaced friends and relatives who were in circumstances
of utmost deprivation and danger also sought refuge with the families
who stayed home.5°
When active fighting subsided, women managed farms and businesses and dealt with the dangers of epidemics of smallpox and dysentery. They had to decide whether to inoculate themselves and their
children with live smallpox virus, risking death or disfiguration to
avoid the near certainty of death if the disease was contracted in its
natural form. 51 Historian Mary Beth Norton described a standard pattern that emerged from letters of Revolutionary couples. At first male
friends and male relatives advised the wife while the husband fought

46.

LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS, sup-ra note 39, at 226 (quoting J. BOYD, THE PAPERS OF

THOMAS JEFFERSON 703-04 (1950)).

47.
48.

Id.
For an early treatment of women's resistance to the passive roles ascribed to them,
see M. BEARD, AmERICA THROUGH WOMEN'S EYES (1933).
49. As people other than elite white men have entered the history profession, many have
focused on the previously neglected history of their own predecessors. "It is as though, like
Columbus, historians have found a whole new hemisphere crying out for exploration, the existence of which will eventually change their comprehension of the previously known world." l.
NORTON & C. BERKIN, supra note 11, at 4. For an early effort to describe women's role in
American history, depicting them as active agents rather than simply subservient, see generally
l. BEARD, supra note 48.
50. LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS, supra note 39, at 195-205.
51. Id. at 200-01.
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in the war. But after "months and sometimes years of controlling their
own affairs, women tended to reply testily when their husbands per-

sisted in assuming their subservience.

"52

Of course, the standard pattern does not describe the lives of all

women in the Revolutionary period. Some, particularly those from
families with fewer material resources, travelled with the Army, working for wages as cooks and nurses. 3 Black women confronted a very
different set of choices. The British, in an effort to disrupt the labor
supply, offered liberty to black slaves. While previously only single
men attempted to flee the plantations, when the British camp lay only
a few miles away, many more women and children fled. Others remained, either because they feared the harsh conditions in the British
refugee camps or were attached to the homes they knew.M
Women also made more direct political contributions to the Revolutionary cause. Boycott of British goods, such as tea, clothing, and
ale, was a central Revolutionary tactic, with both practical and symbolic content. Revolutionary women supported the boycott and urged
others to do so.- Women, sometimes by the hundreds, physically
attacked the property of merchants who hoarded scarce or stocked
British goods. 56 As purchasing was politicized, so too was manufactur-

52. Id. at 216-22.
53. See L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 51-55; LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS, supra note 39, at
213. James Fenimore Cooper paints a fictional portrait of a woman who traveled with the
revolutionary army for motives of patriotism, as well as economic need. See generally J. COOPER,
THE Spy: A TALE OF THE NEUTRAL GROUND (1882).
54. LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS, supra note 39, at 209-10; see generally I. BERLIN, SLAVES
WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974).
55. In 1768 Milcah Martha Moore wrote a poem that assumes women are in fact more
patriotic than men in this regard.
Since the Men form a Party, on fear of a Frown,
Are kept by a Sugar-Plumb, quietly down
Supinely asleep, and depriv'd of their Sign
Are strip'd of their Freedom, and rob'd of their Right
If the Sons (so degenerate) the Blessing despise,
Let the Daughters of Liberty, nobly arise,
And tho' we've no Voice, but a negative here,
The use of the Taxables, let us forbear,
(Then Merchants import till yr. Stores are all full
May the Buyers be few and yr Traffick be dull).
Stand firmly resolved and bid Grenville to see
That rather than Freedom, we'll part with our Tea
And well as we love the dear Drought when adry,
As American Patriots, - our Taste we deny.
M. Moore, "Patriotic Poesy," in 34 WM. & MARY Q. 307-08 (1977).
56. See L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 43-45.
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ing. Patriotic women gathered together in spinning bees, saved rags
for paper making and bandages, turned in lead weights from windows
to be melted down for bullets, and saved family urine for saltpeter.57
The Revolution generated the first women's proclamation and political organization of our Nation. As we have seen, very little in the
dominant political ideology of the time supported a direct political role
for women.58 Nonetheless, in Philadelphia in 1779, the wives and
daughters of the Revolutionary leaders issued a proclamation and initiated a door to door campaign soliciting funds to support the Revolutionary army. The Philadelphia women raised over three hundred
thousand dollars, and inspired women in other places to mobilize similar campaigns.59 In the years following the war, scores of women's
services and reform societies were organized to provide charity for
widows and orphans60 Many of the women who became interested in
politics during the Revolutionary period no longer accepted the convention that their sphere of concern was solely domestic. They continued
to read the newspapers, follow public events, and express their political observations in letters and conversation.61
The stirrings of women's liberty and equality in the late eighteenth
century were not limited to those changes generated by the exigencies
of the Revolutionary War. In the economic sphere, while the law
continued to preserve male control over married women's property,
husbands and wives worked jointly on the farms and in small businesses that dominated the American economy in the era of our founders. One historian of this period, Mary P. Ryan, described women's
economic role as equality of function and dependency of status.Y
Further, even though women lacked formal legal rights, in the post
Revolutionary era, courts of equity increasingly exercised discretion
to recognize married women's property interests. Courts of law also

57.
58.
59.

See id. at 38, 42.
See supra notes 19-22.
See L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 99-111. Kerber comments,
Alany historians of women in the Revolution have admired the Philadelphia project
excessively.... Benjamin Rush, whose wife was an enthusiastic participant in the
campaign, wrote, "The women of America have at last become principals in the
glorious American controversy." But they were not principals, of course, they were
fund raisers, and only for a brief time ....
Id. at 103; see generally LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS, supra note 39, at 177-88.
60. L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 111.
61. LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS, supra note 39, at 188-90.

62.

M.

RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT

ch. 1 (1985).
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protected the rights that some acquired through prenuptial contracts
with their prospective husbands.6
Our founders lived in a world in which both relationships between
men and women, and ideas about those relationships, were changing
rapidly. Increased mobility, the disestablishment of the Protestant
church, the growth of cities and commercial agriculture all weakened
the interlocking control that community, family, and church exerted
over individual social and sexual relationships. Enlightenment ideas
about the relation of individual and society supported a new concept
of marriage as serving individual happiness, not simply the duty to
procreate or to fulfill obligations to one's spouse.6 For the first time
in our history, sexual relationships outside of marriage became possible, as a practical matter, for those who lived outside of small, watchful
communities. At least for elite, white, heterosexual men, a range of
non-marital relationships was tacitly condoned.r
As community, family, and religious constraints on premarital sexuality weakened, young women bore greater responsibility to preserve
their chastity. The incidence of premarital pregnancy rose sharply in
the late eighteenth century. 66 During that time, up to one third of all
brides in New England were pregnant, compared to under ten percent
in the seventeenth century. 67 Illegitimate birth rates also increased.r -3
In the years following the Revolution, both men and women were
allowed greater latitude in selecting their mates. Parents increasingly
permitted children to choose their own partners, and republican prescriptive literature urged parents to do so. 69 Strong, objective evidence

63. On equitable actions to protect women, see Williams, supra note 26. For prenuptial
contracts, see J. DEMOS, supra note 33, at 82-86. On women who managed businesses, see E.
DEXTER, COLONIAL WOMEN OF AFFAIRS (1924); L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 14041.
64. L. STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800 ch. 10 (1977); see
J. FLIEGELMAN, supra note 34.

65.

See J.

FLIEGELMAN,

supra note 34.

66. Historians are divided on the reasons behind this phenomenon. For a comprehensive
discussion, see D. SMITH & M. HINDUS, PremaritalPregnancy in America, 1640-1971: An
Overview and Interpretation, in 5 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIsT. 537 (1975); see generally J.
HOFF-WILSON, The Illusion of Change: Women and the American Revolution, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN RADICALISM 404 (A.

Young ed. 1976).
67. M. GORDON, THE AMERICAN FAMILY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 173 (1978).
68. R. Wells, Illegitimacy and Bridal Pregnancyin Colonial America, in BASTARDY AND
ITS COMPARATIVE HISTORY 354-55 (1980).
69. For example, an advice columnist in the Massachusetts Magazine confronted her
idealized republican parents, Mr. and Mrs. Vigilus, with the dilemma of a daughter who has
fallen in love with a man they believe to be a fortune-hunter. Mrs. Vigilus explained, "We
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of falling birth rates within marriage suggests that in the 1780s, precisely as our founders drafted the Constitution, married couples began
to practice contraception. 70 Contraceptive practices represented a new
willingness to make family size a matter of choice, rather than a fate
determined by God. Such practice also suggested that sexual pleasure,
apart from reproduction, was important to married couples. No new
breakthrough in contraceptive technology explains this decline in birth
rate. Historian Mary Beth Norton attributes increased contraceptive
practice, and the corresponding decline in birth rates, to the "new
egalitarianism" in marriage that arose in response to the Revolution
and women's participation in it. While women's primary role was to
be subordinate in the home, husbands who customarily wielded domestic authority determined their wives' childbearing futures, despite
women's desires to have fewer children. 71 As women developed a sense
of themselves as people, and the culture encouraged a concept of
marriage as a relation of mutuality, contraceptive practices that depended upon cooperation became possible.
Post-war patterns of divorce also suggest a freer, more egalitarian
concept of marriage than was prevalent in pre-Revolutionary years.
During the period when our Constitution was adopted, some states
liberalized divorce laws, divorce became more common, and the proportion of women initiating divorce actions increased. 72 England did not
allow divorce, and some American Revolutionaries defended the freedom to leave an intolerable marriage as a republican right. In 1773,
the English Privy Council disallowed a new Pennsylvania divorce act
and sent instructions to all colonial governors to withhold consent from
any provincial bill of divorce. Freedom to regulate colonial marriages,
like freedom to regulate colonial taxation, became a Revolutionary
issue. 73

abhorred constraint, and we regarded persuasion . . . as no better than a specious form of
tyranny." LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS, sup-ta note 39, at 230. Thomas Jefferson announced the
wedding of his daughter to a French friend, explaining, "[a]ccording to the usage of my country,

I scrupulously suppressed my wishes that my daughter might indulge her own sentiments
freely." Id. at 229.
70. R. Wells, Family Size and Fertility Control in Eighteenth Century America: A Study
of Quaker Families, in 25 POPULATION STUDIES 73 (1971).
71. LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS, supra note 39, at 232.
72. See Cohn, Ccnnecticut's Divorce Mechanism 1639-1969, 14 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 35,
35-48 (1970); Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth Century Aassachusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 592, 594, 613-14 (1976).
Even under the liberalized laws divorce was available only in a narrow set of circumstances,
e.g., desertion, adultery, or fraud, and in some states divorce was not available at all. See L.
KERBER, supra note 19, at 159-73.
73. See L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 160.
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More generally, the new responsibilities and stature that women
had assumed during the Revolution did not vanish when the fighting
ended. Rather, women's efforts were redirected to the vital republican
enterprise of inculcating qualities of virtue in the young. Our founders
assumed that the democracy could work only if citizens were "virtuous"
in their public and private lives. 74 Post-war attitudes reflected a renewed admiration for the central role of the family in a democratic
society. These new attitudes elevated women's status in society because women typically directed household activities. Thus, with startling swiftness, women gained respect in the public arena. By the
1780s and 1790s, authors stressed the value of women in American
society 65
In the post-war years an increased effort to educate women
emerged. But the purpose of that education was merely to make them
better wives and mothers. Dr. Benjamin Rush, a Philadelphian physician and scientist and leading proponent of education for women,
explained that as equal citizens and participants in a democratic society, women should be educated to enable them to teach their sons
76
about liberty and government.
The generalities of republican principles, and the reality of women's
active participation in the war effort, conflicted sharply with dominant
legal and cultural concepts of their subservience and non-existence.
The culture of our founders responded to this tension by constructing
the Republican Mother. The purpose of the Republican Mother was
to educate her children and guide them in paths of morality and virtue.
Linda Kerber observed that the concept of Republican Motherhood
appeared to surpass the Enlightenment in defining the role of women
in American society. Republican Motherhood involved decreasing female involvement in the polis and thus represented yet another conservative choice Americans made in the post-war years. Yet this choice
contradicted the spirit of the Americans' revolutionary radicalism. 7
III.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CONFLICTING
VISIONS OF FAMILIES AND WOMEN CONTINUE

The fourteenth amendment has been the principal constitutional
basis for judicial decisions holding that the state may not discriminate

74. G. WOOD, supra note 14.
75. See LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS, supra note 39, at 243.
76. See B. RUSH, THOUGHTS ON FEMALE EDUCATION 6-7 (1787).
77. L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 283, 287.
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on the basis of gender78 or parental marital status, 79 arbitrarily restrict
access to marriage or to divorce, 8 unreasonably interfere with familial
autonomy,", or burden rights to make choices about procreation.12 By
its terms, the fourteenth amendment recognizes that all people born
in the United States are citizens, and prohibits states from abridging
citizens' privileges and immunities or denying them the equal protection of the law.83
Through the nineteenth century, conceptions of family and women
changed dramatically. With urbanization and the growth of industry,
people increasingly relied upon wages, rather than home based production, for material support. Family size continued to decline, so that
by the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the average white
woman bore fewer than five children. These cataclysmic changes in
both economic and family life produced heightened consciousness of
the role of families and women. Like the original constitutional founders, those who crafted and ratified the Civil War Amendments held
sharply conflicting ideas about families, women, and the meaning these
amendments might have for each.

78. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
79. See supra notes 1 & 5.
80. See supra notes 1 & 2.
81. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
82. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
8:3.The fourteenth amendment provides,
[all] persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens. . . . No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. Fertility rates continued to decline steadily until the 1940s, when the average total
fertility rate was 2.19. In the 1950s and early 1960s, fertility rates rose, and have again declined
in recent years. See figures and discussion, Smith, Family Limitation, Sexual Control, and
Domestic Feminism in Victorian America, in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN 225-26 (N. Cott &
E. Pleck eds. 1979).
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A Story of Liberty and Equalityfor Women and Families
Under the Civil War Amendments

In the years preceding the Civil War Amendments, ideas about
family and women changed significantly from those of the Revolutionary era. In the mid-nineteenth century, the English philosopher, John
Stuart Mill, vigorously denounced discrimination against women as
irrational, unjust, and socially harmful.s Mill was the first major
philosopher since Plato to argue that goodness was the same in a
86
woman as in a man.
In popular culture and ordinary lives, concepts of families and
women also underwent profound change in the nineteenth century.
Over ninety percent of women and over ninety-five percent of married
women were not employed outside the home. 7 The family was thus
the main focus of women's lives. Declining fertility rates, largely dependent upon male cooperation in withdrawal or abstinence, demonstrate both the enhanced power and autonomy of women within the
marriage relation and the declining economic value of children in an
industrial society.s Society attached greater prestige to domesticity
and the nurturing of children. Because women were in charge of chil-

85. Earlier in 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft argued that women should not be denied political
and civil rights, should be allowed to study medicine, politics, and business, and should not be
forced to rely on marriage for economic support. Wollstonecraft, A Vindication qf the Rights
of Women, in THE FEMINIST PAPERS 40-41 (A. Rossi ed. 1974). She deplored the "false system
of education" that made women "only anxious to inspire love, when they ought to cherish a
nobler ambition, and by their abilities and virtues exact respect." Id. Although a Republican
periodical reprinted Vindication and some Americans admired it, for the most part it was not
influential in this country. L. KERBER, supra note 19, at 222-25, 279.
John Stuart Mill was convinced that the utilitarian goal of the greatest happiness for the
greatest number could not be achieved apart from the greatest possible moral and intellectual
advancement of the human race. The emancipation and equality of women would, he argued,
both increase their own happiness and improve humanity. "The ideas and institutions by which
the accident of sex is made the groundwork of an inequality of legal rights, and a forced
dissimilarity of social functions, must ere long be recognized as the greatest hindrance to moral,
social and even intellectual improvement." 3 J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
COLLECTED WORKS 765 (1965). Two other principles figure prominently in Mill's feminism:
liberty, or the opportunity for self-determination, and justice, in the sense of equal consideration
or impartiality. Both of these concerns are, however, explicitly related to the moral and intellectual advancement of humanity, as well as to the happiness of women themselves. J. MILL,
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 89 (1970) [hereinafter SUBJECTION OF WOMEN].
86. S. OKIN, supra note 18, at 220.
87. Smith, supra note 84, at 226.
88. This is Smith's central thesis. See Smith, supra note 84; see generally C. DEGLER,
supra note 22, at ch. 18.
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dren at a time when child rearing assumed great social importance,
motherhood became a source of status and power. Historian Daniel
Scott Smith described women's assertion of autonomy and value within
the family as "domestic feminism. ''s9
The belief that women possessed superior virtue and piety both
enhanced the status of women's work inside the home and supported
new forms of female activity outside of it.- The anxiety and dislocation
generated by urbanization and industrialization led many Americans
to revivalist religions and to a proliferation of new charitable and
community organizations. Women were the mainstay of these groups.
The idea of women's moral and social superiority allowed women to
break the bonds of domesticity to form political associations focused
on such important female issues as social purity, temperance, and care
of the abandoned and infirm.91
From the 1830s, the moral fervor of the abolitionist cause drew
Northern women more deeply into public life than ever before in our
history.9 2 Some of the women who met in the anti-slavery movement
perceived parallels between the subjugation and disenfranchisement
of black people and the oppression of women.9 3 In 1848, the First
Women's Rights Convention, held in Seneca Falls, New York, issued
a proclamation that closely tracked the original Declaration of Independence.m In the years before the Civil War, advocates of women's

89.

Smith, supra note 84, at 222.

90. M. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAiILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW
YORK 1790-1865 ch. 5 (1981); K. SKLAR, CATHERINE BEECHER: A STUDY IN AmERICAN
DOMESTICITY (1973).

91.

E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE
ch. 13 (rev. ed. 1975); M. RYAN, supra note 90, at ch. 3. For example, the
Young Women's Christian Association was founded in the 1860s; The American Association of
University Women in 1882; The Women's Christian Temperance Union in 1874. Id. at 181-82.
UNITED STATES

For a discussion of black women's organizations formed during the nineteenth century, see P.
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND

SEX IN AMERICA 75-117 (1984). On women's organizations in the South, see S. LEBSOCK, THE
FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG ch. 7 (1984).
92. In 1838, Angelina Grimke addressed a committee of the Massachusetts State Legislature
that was conducting hearings on an anti-slavery petition. It was the first time that a woman
had ever appeared before a legislative body. E. FLEXNER, Supra note 91, at 49.
93. The first explicitly feminist organizations arose when anti-slavery groups refused to
allow full participation by women. Id. at 41-43.
94. The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the
part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute
tyranny over her. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world. He has
never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective franchise. He
has compelled her to submit to laws, in the formation of which she had no voice.
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rights pressed their cause in speeches, petitions, and tracts to legislators, the press, and religious leaders.9 5
The supporters of women's liberty and equality achieved significant
victories in the mid-nineteenth century. States adopted married

women's property acts repudiating Blackstone's notion that married
women were civilly dead.9 Institutions of higher education trained
women in a broader range of subjects.9 7 Women campaigned for suffrage across the country.9 By 1870, Wyoming and Utah allowed women
to vote and to serve on juries. 99
Because evolving concepts of family and women's roles were central
cultural concerns in the 1860s, these issues colored and informed the
constitutional debates on the post Civil War Amendments. In an important recent reexamination of the history of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, Professor Peggy Davis demonstrates that the
framers of these amendments perceived that freedom to create ties
of kinship is a sacred and inalienable right. 1°0 Professor Davis shows
that both those who supported and those who opposed the constitutional amendments recognized that basic rights of citizenship, liberty,
and equality encompassed concern with familial relationships.10I
One of the first cases to construe the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment involved the rights of women as citizens and the presumed
relationship between women as individuals and the family. Myra Brad-

The Declaration of Sentiments (First Women's Rights Convention 1848), reprinted ill A.
KRADITOR, Up FROM THE PEDESTAL 185-86 (1970). This remarkable document protests discrimination against women in property law, employment, education, religion, and morality and
insists that women "have immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which belong to
them as citizens of the United States." Id.
95. See generally E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 3-102 (1970).
96. See Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1061-70 (1972).
97. E. FLEXNER, supra note 91, at ch. 2.
98. Id. at ch. 12.
99. Id. at ch. 11. New Jersey's Constitution of 1776 did not specifically disfranchise women,
and they voted sporadically until 1807 when the constitution was amended to limit the franchise
to free white, male citizens. Id. at 164.
100. P. Davis, The Right of Family: Unrecognized Constitutional Sources 11 (1986) (unpublished draft) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 1324 (1864)).
101. Opponents of the Civil War amendments, and the Civil Rights Acts that implemented
them, frequently invoked popular fears of miscegenation. Id. at 2-33. Supporters of the Civil
Rights Acts acknowledged that these acts implicated the rights to marry and form a family,
but addressed the miscegenation fear by posting a "separate-but-equal" approach to marriage
rights that asserted that black and white are equally free to form families with those of their
own race. Id. at 33-34.
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well was the founder and publisher of a legal newspaper widely read
by lawyers in the midwest in the nineteenth century.10 2 She challenged
Illinois' decision denying her a license to practice law solely because
she was a woman, arguing that the state violated the fourteenth
amendment's prohibition of laws that abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.1° After the United States
Supreme Court refused to require her admission to the bar, the Illinois
legislature authorized her to keep her own earnings, made her an
honorary member of the bar, and three years later adopted a statute
assuring all people freedom of occupation.1°4
In the years following the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
many women asserted that the right to vote for federal officials was
a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship. ° 5 No one questioned
that women were citizens, at least for purposes of paying taxes and
holding passports. Thus, the women argued that as citizens, the
privilege and immunity clause of the fourteenth amendment protected
their right to vote.1 06

102. See Minow, Foi inng Udei-,neath Everything That Grows: Toward a History of Family
Law, 198.5 Wis. L. REV. 819, 846.
103. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 3-4 (1876); see Minow, supra note 102, at 849.
105. In 1871, women in many states attempted to vote, invoking the protection they asserted
was provided by the fourteenth amendment's privilege and immunity clause. 1 E. STANTON,
S. ANTHONY, & M. GAGE, HISTORY OF WOMEN'S SUFFERAGE 586-756 (1882).
Susan B. Anthony was prosecuted for voting in New York. United States v. Anthony, 24
F. Cas. 829 (N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459). When the court said "the prisoner has been tried
according to the established forms of law," Anthony replied
Yes, your honor, but by forms of law all made by men, interpreted by men,
administered by men, in favor of men, and against women; and hence, your honor's
ordered verdict of guilty, against a United States citizen for the exercise of "that
citizen's right to vote," simply because that citizen was a woman and not a man.
But yesterday, the same man made forms of law, declared it a crime punishable
with $1,000 fine and six months imprisonment for you, or me, or any of us, to
give a cup of cold water, a crust of bread, or a night's shelter to a panting fugitive
as he was tracking his way to Canada. And every man or woman in whose veins
coursed a drop of human sympathy violated that wicked law, reckless of consequences, and was justified in so doing. As then the slaves who got their freedom
must take it over, or under, or through the unjust forms of law, precisely so, now
must women, to get their right to a vote in this government, take it; and I have
taken mine, and mean to take it at every possible opportunity.
A. KOEDT, E. LEVINE, & A. RAPONE, RADICAL FEMINISM 18-19 (1973).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 provides: "The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162
(1875); see also infra text accompanying note 109 (Court ignored language of amendment).
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Women's claims for liberty and equality, and a corresponding transformation of traditional family structures, were supported by both the
language of the fourteenth amendment and the rhetoric and culture
of the era in which they were adopted. Yet these implications of the
Civil War Amendments were not developed until the latter half of the
twentieth century.
B.

The Dominant Story of the Civil War Amendments

The Supreme Court rejected Myra Bradwell's claim that she should
be licensed to practice law and held that the fourteenth amendment
protected only those privileges and immunities that owed their existence to the federal government, its national character, Constitution,
or laws. 10 7 Justice Bradley, concurring, asserted that "divine ordinance" and "the nature of things" proscribed a "family institution
[that] is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and
independent career from that of her husband."'08 In 1875 the Supreme
Court, ignoring the literal language of the then new Constitutional
amendment, denied women the right to vote because, historically,
women had always been disenfranchised. 10 9 Under the Court's narrow
formulation, neither the right to vote nor the right to practice law
was a privilege or immunity of citizenship.
Much of the history of the Civil War Amendments supports the
Supreme Court's initial refusal to extend constitutional guarantees of
equality and liberty to women. Section two of the fourteenth amendment included the word "male" in the Constitution for the first time. 110
Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, were so enraged at
this language that they urged opposition to the amendment."' Two
years later, feminists sought to persuade Congress to add the word
"sex" to the fifteenth amendment's guarantee of the right to vote.
But again, the attempt to draw persuasive parallels between the status
2
of blacks and women was rebuffed.11

107.
83 U.S.
108.
109.
110.

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); (citing The Slaughter-House Cases,
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872)).
Id. at 140 (Bradley, J., concurring).
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
[-Wlhen the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male

inhabitants of such State ... the basis of representation therein shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 2.
111. E. FLEXNER, supra note 91, at 146-47.
112. Id. at 150-52.
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Both the drafters of the Civil War Amendments, and the judges
who interpreted them, shared social and cultural assumptions about
families and the nature of women. The culture of the nineteenth century had a more self-conscious concept of family than earlier times.113
The family became a unit unto itself. Home became a safe harbor for

the family, where the women and children would spend most of their
time, and where men would take refuge from the outside world. This
setting created a specific division of labor within the family. The husband became the sole wage earner while the wife devoted herself to
activities within the household. The ideal woman was seen as the
centerpiece of the home. Family life had become divorced from the
working world.- 4 Development of the ideology of separate spheres
responded to growing commercialization and industrialization, but also
both predated and facilitated those economic developments. 115 It is an
intellectual and moral concept about who men and women are and
who they should be. As historian Linda Gordon observed, the idea
that women were profoundly different from men was indicative of a
new male-created tenet to keep women in their homes as well as
women's adaptation to this new situation.116
The new concept of the family was also reflected in the law.
Blackstone's fiction that married women were civilly dead was replaced
by a theory that recognized woman's legal personhood but assigned
her a place before the law different from that of her husband. Ordinary
law assumed that the man was the family's breadwinner and representative in the public world and that the woman was the center of the
private world of the home."" Thus in 1873, Justice Bradley reflected
the culture of his time in asserting that Myra Bradwell's desire to
practice law was inconsistent with her ordained role as wife and
mother.11

Even John Stuart Mill, who so presciently defended women's right
to equality in education, careers, and participation in public life, was
unable to imagine a world without traditional family arrangements

Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES
49 (V. Tufte & B. Myerhoff eds. 1979).
114. Id. at 51.
115. M. RYAN, supra note 90, at 239.
116. L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 18 (1976).
117. N. Corr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMEN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND,
1780-1835, at 197-200 (1977).
113. J.

DEMOS,

OF THE FAIILY

118.

See supra note 108.
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built upon the work and devotion of women. There is, Mill asserted,
an "infinitely closer relationship of a child to its mother than to its
father,"'1 9 and "nothing can replace the mother for the education of
children." 120 While Mill defended women's right to choose between a
career and marriage, he assumed that most would continue to choose
marriage. A woman who chooses to marry also chooses to manage a
home and raise children for as many years as these roles demand.
She must forego any other occupation
that would be inconsistent with
121
the requirements of these roles.
The idea of the separate spheres of men and women has deep
implications that we still carry today. For example, the assumption
that women preserve a private world of caring and morality in the
home frees the male political and economic worlds to operate in relentless pursuit of wealth and power. - The idea of separate spheres allows
wage work and public life to be structured on the assumption that
workers and political leaders have no responsibility for the care of
young children or aged parents. The separate spheres arrangement
has produced a pattern of child rearing under which women bear sole
responsibility for the nurture of young children. Virtually all adults,
when they were young and vulnerable, depended upon women. The
intense feelings of love and hate that abject dependency generates
are directed exclusively toward women.
Thus, as in the eighteenth century, it is possible to tell two sharply
conflicting stories about the attitudes of the nineteenth century constitutional founders toward women and families. The story of expanding liberty and equality emphasizes that this was a period in which
women participated in public life at unprecedented levels, and the
culture and law placed high value on the contributions that women
made as mothers and the center of the home. But the dominant assumptions of the nineteenth century denied women the right or capacity to participate in most forms of economic and political life and did
so in a manner that was far more self-conscious and deliberate than
in earlier periods.

119. Letter from John Stuart Mill to Isabella Beecher Hooker (Sept. 14, 1869), reprinted
in 17 LATER LETTERS, COLLECTED WORKS 1640, quoted in OKIN, supra note 18, at 227.
120. Letter from John Stuart Mill to Princess Marie Stcherbatov and Associates (Dec. 18,
1868), reprinted in 17 LATER LETTERS, COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 119, at 1528, quoted
in OKIN, supra note 18, at 227.
121. See SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, sup-ra note 85, at 89.
122. N. COTT, supra note 117, at 197-99.
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IV.

THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS AND A
CONSTITUTION FOR THE AGES

How then does this history illuminate the meaning of our Constitution for contemporary families? Sometimes today particular positions
on current constitutional controversies are defended as intended by
the founders.123 As a dramatic example, in 1986, the Supreme Court

upheld state power to impose criminal sanctions on two adults of the
same sex who engage in private, consensual, sexual activity. Justice
White, writing for the Court, rejected arguments that important individual interests in liberty, privacy, expression, and equality were violated by such prosecution. He invoked the intent of the framers, saying
proscriptions against sodomy are deeply entrenched in history. 124 Common law treated sodomy as a criminal offense and the original thirteen
states forbade such behavior at the time of the ratification of the Bill
of Rights.125 Chief Justice Burger, citing Blackstone, concurred,
suggesting that sodomy was a crime against nature, more heinous
than rape.1 26 Justice Burger also pointed out that the colonies received

English common law, which prohibited sodomy.1'2
This article's brief examination suggests that history is too ambivalent and complex to allow the meaning of the Constitution today to
be inferred by direct, literal appeal to the "intent of the framers."
Historic intent points in different directions. Sharply divergent stories
can be told about concepts of families and the role of women that
were held by the people who adopted our Constitution.
Further, simplistic use of original intent proves far too much. To
the extent that the framers' intent can be fairly fathomed, their dominant conceptions denied the humanity and equality of a majority of
the American people, including women, the Native American population, and people of color. 2' As we have seen, the legal world of the
framers was built upon a particular form of family structure that was
enforced by a complex, intrusive web of legal and social norms that
defined women as civilly dead,'2 and required citizens to submit to
the discipline of a tightly proscribed form of familial governance. 130
123. See supra note 10.
124. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. In relation to black people the framers were quite conscious of the tension between
the rhetoric of freedom, on the one hand, and the reality of slavery, on the other. See B.
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 232-46 (1967).

129. See supra note 26-27.
130. See supra note 29-34.
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That belief structure is inconsistent with the more abstract principles upon which our nation was founded. Fortunately for the brilliance
and stability of our constitutional structure, the framers did not intend
that their personal expectations, purposes, and intentions would control the future meaning of specific constitutional provisions.13' The
Constitution, as any political document, is the product of compromise
and is bound by the culture of its time. It incorporates departures
from its own best principles. Both the disenfranchisement of women
and the institution of slavery violated republican principles of equality
and liberty of all people. The framers understood the Constitution and
the Republic it shapes as an experiment, built upon the experience
and theories of others, but, at the same time, creating something truly
unique.132 The founders intended the spirit of experimentation to continue and grow.
The Supreme Court participates, with the original framers, in giving meaning to the generalities of the Constitution. More broadly, all
of the American people participate in giving meaning to the Constitution. The Supreme Court does not act alone or of its own initiative
in articulating the meaning of the Constitution. Rather, the Court
responds to evolving concepts of justice and equality in giving flesh
to the Constitution. We the people develop norms of justice and equality in many ways. For example, the Court applied the first amendment
to state and local officials when the men and women of the labor
movement took to the streets asserting they had rights to assemble
and speak. 13 In the 1960s, the Court responded to the moral voices
of the civil rights movement in first opening many of the institutions
of American life to black people.
While sexism and deep intrusion to enforce particular familial relations were pervasively rooted in the specific intent of our constitutional
founders, the Supreme Court has correctly recognized that laws allocating rights and responsibilities on the basis of gender are inconsistent with our more general constitutional commitment to individual

131. See generally Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885 (1985).
132. In the Virginia ratification convention, Madison observes: "I can see no danger in
submitting to practice an experiment which seems to be founded on the best theoretic principles."
3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 12, at 394. At the South Carolina convention, Charles Pinckney said,
"our Constitution was in some measure an experiment," and that he considered it "the fairest
experiment ever made in favor of human nature." 4 id. at 262.
133. D. KAIRys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 140 (1982) (discussing
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)).
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liberty and equality. -:Blatantly sexist concepts of families and women
are so inconsistent with contemporary values that even Attorney General Meese, who is zealous in urging adherence to the original intent
of the f-amers, also affirms that discrimination on the basis of gender
"offends our best principles as a nation."'' 3 Venerable forms of gender
discrimination have been rejected not primarily because the modern
Supreme Court is wiser and more sensitive, but rather because women
came to understand their situation more clearly and to speak out for
equality. Women and men have developed new norms of gender equality both in public debate and political action, and in forging new forms
of commitment in intimate relationships and in reordering daily personal lives.
It has proven much easier to integrate women into the realms of
economic and political life than it has been to transform the familial
structures built on the assumptions of women as second class citizens.
The Supreme Court has recognized and given normative constitutional
force to the social reality that women are no longer "destined solely
for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the
marketplace and the world of ideas. ' ' 13 6 But the mirror image of this
proposition, that men are no longer destined solely for the marketplace
and the world of ideas, but bear individual and collective responsibility
social
for the nurture of the young and the vulnerable, does not reflect
137
reality and does not carry normative constitutional force.
Professor Martha Minow suggests that we conceptualize the Constitution as foundational and observes that the dictionary tells us that
a foundation is the "ground upon which something is built up or overlaid." 138 For 200 years, Americans have engaged in the process of
constructing our social edifice upon the foundation of our Constitution.
That foundation has provided a language and process within which we
have engaged in passionate debates about our identities, values, and
visions as a people.

134. See supra note 4 & 9.
135. Address by Att'y Gen. Edwin Meese, Dickinson College 13 (Sept. 17, 1985). It should
be noted that the Attorney General asserts his opposition to gender bias while attacking affirmative action programs that would aid women in overcoming centuries of discrimination. Id. at
10-17.
136. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
137. Professor Wendy Williams used this image in her Bicentennial talk at the New York
City Public Library, April 6, 1987.
138. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 487 (anniv. ed. 1981). Professor Martha Minow
pointed out this definition at New York University's Law and Society Colloquium, March 11,
1987.
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It is also appropriate to conceptualize families as foundational to
our individual personalities and character, as well as to all other social,
economic, and political institutions. For most of our history that foundation, and women's central role in maintaining it, have simply been
assumed. Society has excluded the voices of women from the debates
by which our culture and law are shaped. Yet, just as plainly, women
have always played a vital role in constructing our nation. A challenge
for the coming century is to reconstruct the family, and the society
of which it is an integral part, to promote the liberty and equality of
all people.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss3/1

30

